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INSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
IN THE POST-CHAPMAN WORLD
SusAN N. HERMN*
Rhodes v. Chapman' was the first case in which the Supreme Court was
called upon to discuss the interplay between general prison conditions and
the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.- The stage
had been set for Chapman long before the case arose. The Court had
examined other, narrower eighth amendment claims;3 lower federal courts
had been entertaining a growing number of broad scale challenges to state
prison conditions4 and granting increasingly broad injunctive relief;5 and
with the explosion in prison population, overcrowding and overtaxed facili-
ties had become the norm in the country's prisons and jails.0 Unfortunately,
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Before teaching, Ms. Herman was
apro se law clerk for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1974-1976); she was
also a staff attorney (1976-1978) and Associate Director (1978-1980) for the Prisoners' Legal
Services of New York.
1. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
2. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), held that conditions in the Arkansas prison
system's isolation cells constituted cruel and ununsual punishment when viewed in conjunc-
tion with the length of confinement in such cells; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), held
that denial of medical care may constitute cruel and unusual punishment although it did not
on the facts asserted.
4. Institutional litigation came of age with several pioneering cases in the south. See
Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974),
vacated and remanded on other grounds per curiaz, 522 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc);
Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th
Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds per curiam, 522 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). Prison condition litigation burgeoned until, when
Chapman was decided in 1981, "individual prisons or entire prison systems in at least 24
States [had] been declared unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
.. ", 452 U.S. at 353 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring), and 8,000 prison conditions cases were
pending. Id. at 354 (citing 3 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS
34 (1980)). According to a recent report of the National Prison Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union, 28 states' prisons are now operating under court order. 13 NATIONAL
CoUNcIL. oN CRimE D DELINQUENCY, CmuAL. JusTicE NEwsLETTER No. 5 (March 15,
1982).
5. See Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of
Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the
Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REv. 893, 899 n.50 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Robbins &
Buser]; Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARv. L. REv.
626 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Complex Enforcement].
6. The National Institute of Justice, shortly before Chapman, published a five volume
study of conditions and population trends in the country's prisons and jails. The study found
that from 1973-78 the prison population had grown at a rate of 7.4%o each year. I NArIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, A1mIUcAN PRISONS AND JAILS 14, Table 1.1 (1980). Defining a
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Chapman did little to resolve either the underlying problem of overcrowded
prisons or several key questions of eighth amendment interpretation.
Chapman was a limited and factually based decision. The Court found
that double ceiling was neither per se unconstitutional,7 nor unconstitutional
in the context of conditions at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
(SOCF).8 These holdings nevertheless left open many questions because the
context of Chapman was an unusual one: the district court described SOCF
as "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class facility,", finding the food "ade-
quate in every respect," the ventilation system adequate, the cells free of
offensive odors, the temperature and noise levels well controlled, and the
provision of medical care, library space, visiting and other recreational
facilities acceptable as well.10 The Supreme Court held that these "generally
favorable findings"'" overshadowed the factors the district court had used
as a predicate for finding an eighth amendment violation.1 2
"crowded" facility as one providing less than 60 square feet of living space per inmate, the
study found that 65% of state prisoners and 61% of federal prisoners were living in crowded
conditions. Id. at 61-62. The study was not encouraging about the ability of the country's
prison system to meet the demand for incarceration. Figures available for more recent years
indicate that the situation is becoming even more disturbing. The Bureau of Justice Statistics
estimated that in 1981, the total.United States prison population increased by 11.8%, and
that in 1982, the population increased by 6.9% in the first half of the year alone. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS AT MIDYEAR (1982).
7. 452 U.S. at 347.
8. Id. at 342.
9. Id. at 341 (quoting 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (S.D. Ohio 1977)).
10. See 452 U.S. at 341. These conditions differ radically from conditions usually at
issue in institutional litigation. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 20.
11. 452 U.S. at 343.
12. The district court had based its finding of an eighth amendment violation on five
factors: 1) the length of the terms of imprisonment served by the inmates at SOCF, 2) the fact
that the institution was housing 38% more inmates than its design capacity, 3) its acceptance
of studies recommending allowance of at least 50 to 55 square feet of living quarters per
prisoner as reflecting contemporary standards of decency, 4) a finding that inmates spent
most of their time in their cells with their cellmates, and 5) the fact that double ceiling had
become a practice at SOCF, rather than a temporary condition. The Supreme Court found
that the length of confinement, the amount of time spent in the cell, and the permanency of
the practice of double ceiling unimpressive in light of its holding that double ceiling is not per
se unconstitutional, and that conditions at SOCF on the whole were not unconstitutional.
The Court rejected the expert studies upon which the district court had relied and quoted the
admonition in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543-44 & 543 n.27 (1979) that while expert
opinions may be helpful, they do not establish constitutional minima. See 452 U.S. at 348
n.13. As for the fact that prison population exceeded rated capacity, the majority seemed to
willfully misunderstand the concept of design capacity, treating the rated capacity of SOCF
as little more than an attempt to predict prison population. See id. at 349 n.15. Finally, again
slighting the import of expert testimony, the Court treated the potential for frustration,
violence and tension inhering in the practice of double ceiling as an unproven factual
assertion, and disposed of this issue by observing that plaintiffs had not proven and the
district court had not found that violence had increased disproportionately to the increase in
population. See id. at 349 n.14. It is interesting to note that most of the district court's
reasoning is discussed by the Supreme Court in footnotes, and treated as peripheral to what
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. XII:299
INSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
The opinion thus provides a model for judicial review of institutions
with relatively tolerable conditions. But most prisons and jails in the country
are not shiny or new, 13 and bear little resemblance to the top-flight, first
class facility involved in Chapman.14 Lower courts reviewing conditions in
the average institution will find that Chapman does not provide answers to
their questions about the scope of the eighth amendment -cruel and unu-
sual conditions are more miserable than those at SOCF, but how much more
miserable? Finding the conditions at SOCF constitutional also permitted the
Court to avoid the issue of remedies. The Chapman opinion even left room
for disagreement as to the role of the federal courts in institutional litiga-
tion. 15 This paper will discuss the impact Chapman has had and is likely to
have on federal and state court institutional litigation by focusing on these
three areas: the scope of judicial review, the scope of the underlying consti-
tutional right and the scope and nature of the remedial power. The impact,
at least thus far, has not been as negative as some critics predicted.
I
INSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. The Scope of Federal Review
One of the central tenets of the Burger Court's judicial philosophy has
been that federal court intervention into state and local institutions should
be limited. The play of federalism and comity concepts has been particularly
evident in cases involving prisoners' rights.' Rhodes v. Chapman itself
follows a series of Burger Court decisions that take a narrow view of
prisoners' rights and a broad view of the deference due prison administra-
tors. The case might, therefore, be viewed as part of a pattern of cases
heralding a return to the "hands off" doctrine under which courts refused
the Court characterized as the true issue of the adequacy of conditions in the prison as a
whole.
13. Of the 559 prisons and jails existing in the United States in 1978, 79 were built
between 1875 and 1924, 141 between 1925 and 1949, 164 between 1950 and 1969, 150 between
1970 and 1978. An additional 25 are listed simply as having been built before 1975. 3
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUStiCE, AmEmcAN PRISONS AND JAs 23 (1980).
14. Another shiny new facility was the subject of the case in which the Court considered
the rights of pretrial detainees, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The Metropolitan
Correctional Center (MCC) had been built in 1975, and the Wolfish case was commenced
before the year ended. The Supreme Court declared that the MCC represented "the best and
most progressive penological planning" and it differed "markedly" from the familiar image
of a jail. See id. at 525. Conditions were found not to violate the detainees' due process rights
because the detainees were not being "punished." See infra note 22.
15. Justice Blackmun expressed his concern that Chapman might be read as authorizing
a federal court retreat. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 369 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
16. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
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to review prison conditions at all. 17 But this view of Chapman is unnecessar-
ily pessimistic. Chapman is, in fact, the most encouraging decision on
prisoners' rights to have emerged from the Supreme Court in a decade. The
majority of reported district court prison conditions cases decided since
Chapman have taken a reasonably generous view of the permissible scope of
federal court review and have found at least some of the conditions at issue
to violate eighth amendment standards. 8
Nothing in the Chapman opinion is inconsistent with the meaningful
scope of review that these district courts have provided. Chapman did rule
against the prisoner plaintiffs on the facts, but Justice Powell's opinion for
the Court reaffirmed the point that "[c]ourts certainly have a responsibility
to scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual confinement, and conditions in a
number of prisons, especially older ones, have justly been described as
'deplorable' and 'sordid.' "19 The district courts have taken the Supreme
Court at its word, and have shown themselves both willing and able to
distinguish Chapman and to "discharge their duty to protect constitutional
rights' 20 when confronted with deplorable prison conditions .21
17. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review
the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). The similarity of the Burger Court's
recent theories of the proper scope of judicial review to the old "hands off" doctrine, is
noted in Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial
Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRJm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211 (1980).
18. Decisions about overcrowding in jails, where the constitutional issue is due process
rather than the eighth amendment are comparable. See Martins v. Carey, 563 F. Supp. 984
(D. Or. 1983); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1121-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (prisons
and jails); French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910, 924-26 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (reformatory); Union
County Jail Inmates v. Scanlon, 537 F. Supp. 993, 1007-08 (D.N.J. 1982) (jail with sentenced
inmates and pretrial detainees); McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 742, 759-63 (W.D. La.
1982) (jail with sentenced inmates and pretrial detainees); Smith v. Fairman, 528 F. Supp.
186, 199-201 (C.D. I1. 1981), rev'd, 690 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
2125 (1983) (prison); Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. 435, 522-26 (N.D. Ind. 1981)
(prison); Heitman v. Gabriel, 524 F. Supp. 622, 629 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (jail). Several courts
found unconstitutional conditions in local jails without discussing the extent to which their
findings might have been based on the eighth amendment rights of sentenced inmates housed
in those institutions, or on the due process rights of pretrial detainees. See Gross v. Tazewell
County Jail, 533 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Va. 1982); Vasquez v. Gray, 523 F. Supp. 1359
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). The court in Toussaint v. Rushen, 553 F. Supp. 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
granted plaintiff state prisoners a preliminary injunction on finding that they were likely to
succeed on the merits of their eighth amendment claim; the court in Stickney v. List, 519 F.
Supp. 617 (D. Nev. 1981) appointed an expert witness to examine the conditions at the
Northern Nevada Correctional Center and to report to the court on the constitutionality of
those conditions. Other cases involving prison conditions, including overcrowding, have been
resolved by consent decree. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
This survey covers only reported cases. Although some unreported opinions may find
eighth amendment violations, it is likely that dismissals for failure to state a claim make up
the bulk of the unreported cases. Opinions in prison conditions cases seem to be written
primarily as predicates for relief.
19. 452 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 352 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405-06 (1974)).
21. A number of courts have focused on the differences between the institutions whose
conditions they were reviewing and the modern facilities in Chapman and in Wolfish. See
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To justify a retreat from federal court review of prison conditions, the
courts would have to read the Chapman opinion as taking color from prior
and subsequent Supreme Court prisoners' rights opinions that adopt a
highly restrictive view of the federal court's role. Chapman, however, is not
wholly a part of the same picture because the eighth amendment claim on
which it is based is unique in several respects.
The Supreme Court prisoners' rights cases2 can be roughly divided into
three categories: 1) cases based on alleged violations of specific provisions of
the Bill of Rights other than the eighth amendment; 2) procedural due
process cases; and 3) eighth amendment cases. The first category of cases,
specific constitutional violations, has principally involved first amendment
claims: prisoners' claims of freedom of expression,2 freedom of religion, 24
and even freedom of association.25 The prototypical case, Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,26 exemplifies the Court's grudging atti-
tude toward inmates' first amendment rights. The inmates in Jones claimed
a right under the first amendment to form an inmate union.27 Prison admin-
istrators claimed that the exercise of this freedom would jeopardize institu-
tional security.28 The Court held that in order to establish a constitutional
supra note 14; see also French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. at 925 ("In contrast to the new, clean,
and relatively comfortable facilities described in Wolfish and Rhodes, each affording the
inmates ample time and space for day room activities, we find in the Indiana Reformatory
the 'barred cells, dank, colorless corridors, and clanging steel gates' absent from the New
York MCC."); Union County Jail Inmates v. Scanlon, 537 F. Supp. at 1003 (describing the
Union County Jail as the "traditional Jail" that JVoffish was declared not to involve);
McMurry v. Phelps, 553 F. Supp. at 762 (finding Wolfish and Chapman "factually inappo-
site" to the "grossly overcrowded" conditions at the Ouachita Parish Jail); Hendrix v.
Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. at 524 (differentiating the smaller cells and greater restrictions on
personal freedom in Indiana State prison from the conditions present in W~olfish and
Chapman). But see Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 427 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (facility
declared to present "almost a carbon copy" of the facts in Chapman and Wolfish).
22. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 520, which dealt with the rights of pretrial detainees, is not a
true prisoners' rights case because it draws a sharp distinction between the constitutional
rights of pretrial detainees and those of prisoners. The Court held that the eighth amendment
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to pretrial detainees, since
individuals who have not been convicted are not to be subjected to any punishment at all.
The source of protection for the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees was held to be the
due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendment. Thus, the constitutional analysis
differs in cases involving prisoners and pretrial detainees.
23. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (access to news media); Procunier v. Mar-
tinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (mail censorship). The first amendment, of course, applies to state
prisoners through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
24. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
25. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
26. Id.
27. The inmates claimed the right to form an inmate "union," actually a lobbying
group, to work for the improvement of prison conditions. Id. at 122.
28. Defendants asserted that the union would threaten discipline and control in the
prison by increasing friction between inmates and prison personnel, creating a divisive
element within the inmate population, fostering power figures among the inmates, and
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violation, the plaintiff prisoners had the burden of proving that the defend-
ants had "exaggerated their response" to security concerns. 20 Placing the
burden on the plaintiffs to disprove the presence of any danger, rather than
on the defendants to prove some basis in fact or experience for their dire
predictions, changes and dilutes usual first amendment protections simply
because prisoners are involved.3 0
The second category of prisoners' rights cases examines prisoners'
rights to procedural fairness in connection with such decisions as parole
release, 3 ' interprison transfers32 and, most recently, transfers to administra-
tive segregation units. 33 The Burger Court has evolved a bizarre doctrine in
this area, holding that prisoners have no constitutional right to due process
because they have no "liberty interest" in their own freedom.3 4 Prisoners
have a liberty interest, and a consequent right to some form of procedure
before parole release decisions, for example, only when the state creates an
interest in parole and confers it upon its prisoners. 35 This doctrine seems
designed to deflect due process claims to state law and the state courts.3 0
Eighth amendment claims involve a constitutional right significantly
different in nature and application from those in the first two categories.
One of the major questions that occupied the Court in connection with the
first amendment cases was whether and to what extent the first amendment
should apply to prisoners at all. The Court wrote a lengthy opinion on
censorship of inmate mail without ever deciding whether inmates have first
possibly encouraging work stoppages. Id. at 127. There was, however, no evidence that the
union had created, or was likely to create, any such problems. Id. at 143-44 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
29. Id. at 128.
30. In first amendment cases not involving prisoners, it is the government's burden to
justify restrictions, even incidental restrictions on free expression. See, e.g., L. TRIDBE,
AMRucAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 683 (1978). The Jones decision would be less severe if the
burden of proof were not shifted in cases involving core first amendment rights of free
expression and religion. Compare St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980) with St.
Claire v. Cuyler, 643 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1980) (opinion on denial of petition for rehearing en
banc).
31. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979).
32. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
33. Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983).
34. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 224-27. The theory is that lawful incarceration
extinguishes an inmate's right to liberty, whether that liberty be the conditional freedom of
parole or the relative freedom of confinement in a less secure prison.
35. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. at 1, for example,
held that Nebraska had created a liberty interest in parole by enacting a parole statute
limiting the discretion of parole authorities.
36. An extreme example of the Burger Court's attempt to transfer due process litigation
to state court is Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), holding that an inmate whose
property was negligently lost by defendant prison officials was not denied due process so long
as the state courts stood ready to hear his claim.
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amendment rights. 37 Although the Court subsequently decided that the first
amendment is one of the rights that prisoners do retain 3 8 it has also stressed
the need for accommodation between first amendment principles and the
realities of prison life;39 Jones is a prime example of this accommodation.
The Court's approach in this area necessitates examining each constitu-
tional provision separately to determine whether the right it guarantees is
one which survives lawful incarceration, and even if it does survive, whether
and to what extent it wil be subject to "accommodation" or dilution. With
respect to a prisoner's right to fourth amendment protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, for example, the Court might recite that
"[lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation
of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system, ' 40 and find that prisoners have no fourth
amendment rights.4' Alternatively, the Court might find that fourth amend-
ment rights do survive, but have a different meaning in the prison context.
Similarly, the Court has taken the view that constitutional due process
rights do not survive lawful incarceration. 42 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for
the Court in its most recent due process opinion, expressed his attraction for
the extreme view that prisoners should be deemed never to have a right to
procedural due process in connection with decisions about the conditions of
their confinement, 43 even if the state has created a liberty interest. While
stopping short of adopting this extreme view, the majority nevertheless has
found that inmates do not have a constitutional right to due process, but
only such rights as the state allows. In due process cases too, the Court has
stressed the need for an "accommodation" between the requirements of due
process and the realities of prison life. 44
37. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408. The case was decided on the first amend-
ment rights of the prisoners' correspondents rather than those of the inmates.
38. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 822.
39. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. at 129 ("an inmate does
not retain those first amendment rights that are 'inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or
with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system,' " quoting Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. at 822).
40. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948), quoted in Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct.
at 869 (1983); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. at 125; Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
41. Cf. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 556-57; Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962).
Both cases declined to decide whether inmates have any fourth amendment rights on finding
that the search involved in each case was not unreasonable and would not have violated the
fourth amendment.
42. See Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. at 869-70; Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 224-26.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-36. See generally Note, Two Views of a Prioner's
Right to Due Process: Meachum v. Fano, 12 HAxv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 405 (1977) for cogent
criticism of this doctrine.
43. Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. at 870-71.
44. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 556 ("Tjhere must be mutual accommodation
between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of
general application.").
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By contrast, the eighth amendment unquestionably applies to pris-
oners. It would be absurd to contend that the eighth amendment is a right
that conviction or lawful incarceration extinguishes, or even dilutes, since
the amendment was designed to protect the rights of the convicted. 45 Eighth
amendment protection is one of the very few rights, perhaps the only right,
whose meaning expands in the context of prison.
The nature of the right involved is as distinctive as its status in the
constitutional pantheon. The eighth amendment does not confer the kind of
affirmative rights the Burger Court appears to deem luxuries or privileges to
be permitted or denied prisoners at will.46 Rather, the eighth amendment is
negative; it limits the state's power to punish. While first amendment or due
process cases generally involve discrete, individual claims dependent upon
discrete, individual facts, eighth amendment conditions claims tend to be
collective and systemic. 47 This distinction has implications for the amount
and type of litigation the federal courts will hear on eighth amendment
conditions claims as opposed to first amendment or due process claims; 48
more significantly, it has implications for the obligation of the federal
courts to hear eighth amendment conditions claims.
The archetypal claim the Burger Court wishes to cast out of federal
court is the allegation in Parratt v. Taylor49 that state prison officials
negligently allowed plaintiff's twenty-three dollar hobby kit to be lost. As
one thoughtful judge observed, it is difficult to provide a wholly satisfactory
45. As the Court noted in Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535, those not convicted are not to be
punished at all. See Chapman, 452 U.S. at 345 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. at 685;
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted". The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF.
L. REV. 839 (1969).
46. Underlying Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union and other cases consid-
ering the scope of the first amendment rights of prisoners (the right to send and receive
uncensored mail, for example) seems to be some notion that the interests involved are not
critical, and may be freely surrendered in the face of any hint of a competing interest in
institutional security. In Hewitt v. Helms, the Court exhibits a similarly cavalier attitude to
the liberty interests of prisoners, remarking that a prisoner's interest in whether he is
confined to administrative segregation is "not one of great consequence."103 S. Ct. at 872.
But see id. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disparity between conditions in general population
and administrative segregation is "drastic").
47. See Note, Complex Enforcement, supra note 5, arguing that the systemic focus of
prison conditions cases strains even traditional eighth amendment doctrine derived from
cases responding to discrete, individual claims.
48. Because of their collective nature, prison conditions cases are ideal for class action
treatment, and even for consolidation of cases addressing conditions at different institutions
that are part of the same system. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982) (examining conditions in twelve Tennessee institutions). Of course, individual
eighth amendment claims such as that considered in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)
(individual denial of adequate medical care) will require individual treatment. It is the general
conditions cases, claiming overcrowding or a systemic failure of services, for example, that
are most easily distinguishable from cases involving other specific constitutional provisions,
or the due process clause.
49. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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answer to a hypothetical observer who questions the use of federal court
resources to litigate every case in which an inmate alleges that several packs
of cigarettes were taken from him.50 There is an enormous and crucial
difference between a due process claim based on the loss of a hobby kit or
some cigarettes and a claim that all Texas prisoners are suffering cruel and
unusual punishment due to prison overcrowding, and other abysmal condi-
tions. 51 Whatever one's opinion of the Burger Court's reluctance to involve
the federal courts in the protection of individual inmates' property or
freedom of expression, the need to protect prisoners from systemic cruel and
unusual punishment presents a strong, indeed a compelling justification for
federal intervention. 52 The state, having made the policy or financial deci-
sions that prevent prison administrators from operating less crowded and
more humane facilities, cannot be relied upon to correct the problem. 53 The
need for intervention is indisputable, and the constitutional obligation of
the courts to intervene is inescapable.
Finally, the state's interest in the eighth amendment cases is of a
different order than it is in the due process and first amendment cases. In
Jones and other cases involving specific constitutional guarantees, the de-
fendant prison officials claimed that the exercise of the right asserted would
jeopardize a legitimate state interest in security, order or rehabilitation.?
The Court was fearful of second guessing prison officials' judgment, lest
escapes and riots ensue. The result of this fear was a policy of deferring to
prison administrators' expertise.55 Prison overcrowding, on the other hand,
50. As Judge Adams stated, holding that plaintiff has stated a due process claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in such a case
will also no doubt generate a certain amount of disbelief in those taxpayers and
citizens generally, not to mention judges and lawyers, who will ask how federal
courts have come to be concerned with a case in which a state prisoner alleges
simply that his constitutional rights were violated when a prison guard took seven
packages of cigarettes from him. I have yet to answer this question satisfactorily for
myself.
Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 1973) (Adams, J., concurring).
51. This was, and is the issue in Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 452 (1983), modified on reh'g, 688 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103. S. Ct. 1438 (1983) (the most recent opinion on the merits in a litigation which has been
pending for years).
52. See Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEx. L. REv. 903
(1976); Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for
Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 367, 385-88 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Prison Reform] Both authors advocate the duty of the federal courts to hear prison
conditions cases, particularly where the state has shown itself to be insensitive to prevailing
conditions.
53. See Johnson, supra note 52, at 905-16.
54. See supra note 28 for a description of the specters of danger defendants raised in
Jones itself.
55. This deference also provides a convenient excuse for limiting the number of state
prisoner cases the federal courts must hear. In fact, this concern seems to have inspired the
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exists not by decision, but by default. No one has decided that overcrowding
is sound correction policy; no one fears a deterioration of security, order or
rehabilitation in the prisons if overcrowding is ameliorated by court order.
To the contrary, court orders reducing overcrowding are welcomed by many
prison administrators.56 The principal state interest threatened by judicial
decisions concerning overcrowding is fiscal; the constitutional problems
here, unlike those at issue in Jones, can be cured to everyone's satisfaction
with money. 57 Thus, the deferential stance adopted by the Court in its other
prisoners' rights cases is simply not appropriate in overcrowding, or other
general prison conditions litigation under the eighth amendment.58 The few
eighth amendment cases decided by the Court before Chapman also seem to
recognize this, and do not share Jones' preoccupation with eliminating or
accommodating the constitutional right involved, or with deference.5
When the opinion in Rhodes v. Chapman is viewed apart from the
background of the due process and first amendment cases, its message
becomes less clear. On the one hand, the Court strongly reaffirms the
federal courts' obligation to "scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual con-
finement;" '10 on the other hand, the Court refers to legislative and public
opinion as informing eighth amendment standards.' On the one hand, the
Court cites, apparently approvingly, federal court cases finding prison con-
ditions to be below constitutional standards and ordering broad injunctive
relief;62 on the other hand, courts are urged not to assume "that state
Court's procedural due process doctrine, see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 229 ("The
federal Courts do not sit to supervise state prisons .... ).
56. See Chapman, 452 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Even prison officials
have acknowledged that judicial intervention has helped them to obtain support for needed
reform.")
57. The fear that a federal court might threaten the state's interest in incarcerating the
convicted by opening the prison doors on finding unconstitutional overcrowding is not
credible in light of the great caution shown by the courts in their choices of remedy. See, e.g.,
Vazquez v. Gray, 523 F. Supp. at 1365-66. See infra text accompanying notes 97-106.
Confronted with a declaration that its prisons or jails are unconstitutionally overcrowded, a
state will generally be allowed by the courts to choose whether to release selected inmates or
whether to create more space. Building new facilities is an expensive solution. The National
Council on Crime and Delinquency estimated that to build its way out of its overcrowding
problem, California would have to construct one new facility per month for the next two
years. See 30 CGum. L. REP. 2259 (Jan. 6, 1982).
58. See Chapman, 452 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also, Note, Complex
Enforcement, supra note 5, at 642 (the idea of deference is predicated upon features unique
to discrete adjudication; expertise is irrelevant where the problem under review is a systemic
dysfunction).
59. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (finding protracted isolated confinement
cruel and unusual); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (denial of medical care may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
60. 452 U.S. at 352.
61. Id. at 348-49 & 348 n.13.
62. Id. at 352 n.17.
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legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the
Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to
achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system .... 2,63
On balance, Chapman does not provide any final, clear or consistent
answer to the question of the scope of federal court review of eighth
amendment prison conditions cases. Given that the Court does reaffirm the
federal courts' obligation in this area, however, and that its decision for the
state is narrow and factually based, the opinion allows and even to some
degree encourages meaningful federal court review. The opinion certainly
does not justify wholesale abdication of federal court review."
B. The Scope of the Eighth Amendment
Federal court review, however vigorous, will not be meaningful unless
the eighth amendment protection it provides is reasonably generous. Al-
though the opinion in Chapman is dense with eighth amendment catch-
phrases,65 it does not directly address the two questions critical to defining
the scope of the eighth amendment: How is cruel and unusual punishment
to be measured, 6 and what minimum standard does the eighth amendment
embody? On the first issue Chapman seems to provide an answer, albeit
without justification or discussion: whether a particular prison condition is
cruel and unusual is judged by viewing the totality of conditions at the
63. Id. at 352.
64. That some courts have derived more discouraging messages from Chapman is
probably due at least in part to their viewing Chapman as part of a trend that includes the
other prisoners' rights decisions. See supra text accompanying notes 21-58. Even reading
Chapman by itself, one might take discouraging remarks out of context and conclude, as
Justice Blackmun did, that "the Court's opinion in this case today might be regarded,
because of some of its language, as a signal to prison administrators that the federal courts
are now to adopt a policy of general deference to such administrators and to state legislatures
.... "452 U.S. at 369 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See Comment, Rhodes v. Chapman:
Prison Overcrowding-Evolving Standards Evading an Increasing Problem, 8 N. ENG. J.
PRisoN L. 249, 260-62 (1982). I do not believe such a reading is required or even warranted.
65. The Court quotes prior cases describing the eighth amendment as prohibiting pun-
ishments that "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," 452 U.S. at 346
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); are "totally without penological
justification," 452 U.S. at 346 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183); or transgress the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," 452 U.S. at 346 (quoting
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
66. The Court protests that no static test can be used to measure eighth amendment
violations, 452 U.S. at 346. However, the question of how cruel and unusual punishment is
to be proved is distinct from the question of whether the guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishment can be reduced to a formula.
A survey and discussion of the various tests used by the lower federal courts in eighth
amendment prison conditions cases before Chapman can be found in Fair, The Lower
Federal Courts as Constitution Makers: The Case of Prison Conditions, 7 A.i. J. CaW. L.
119 (1979); see also Prison Reform, supra note 52 (arguing for an eighth amendment analysis
tying review of prison conditions to the legitimate purposes of punishment).
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prison. This test can be inferred from one remark in the majority opinion,0 7
from the fact that the Court actually reviewed a range of conditions at
SOCF, 8 and from Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, asserting that this
in fact is the test the Court sets forth A9 Virtually all of the lower courts after
Chapman have agreed that "totality of conditions" is the test the Court
adopted;70 only the Ninth Circuit rejects this test. 71 The choice of test, if
choice it be, is unobjectionable. It is both more generous and more manage-
able than the alternative of examining prison conditions in isolation and, as
one court put it, missing the forest for the trees. 72
Chapman's decision that neither double ceiling nor, by implication,
overcrowding, 73 is per se unconstitutional, does seem to necessitate a totality
of conditions approach unless the courts are to ignore most overcrowding
issues altogether. According to Chapman, it is the impact on other prison
conditions, such as provision of food service, protection of personal safety,
and so forth, that may render double ceiling or overcrowding cruel and
unusual. If a prison were seriously overcrowded, a court using the totality of
conditions test would examine the impact of the overcrowding on various
facets of prison life. If the court were to find the food service, for example,
to be deficient, it could then order relief.7 4 Under a nontotality test, if the
food service, viewed in isolation, did not amount to cruel and unusual
67. 452 U.S. at 347 ("Conditions... alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of
the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities").
68. See id. at 340-43, 348-49 & 348 n.13.
69. Id. at 363 n.10.
70. See Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1139; Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 335 (5th Cir. 1982);
Madyun v. Thompson, 657 r.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 1981); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. at
1121; Williams v. Lane, 548 F. Supp. 92 7, r30-31 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Union County Jail
Inmates v. Scanlon, 537 F. Supp. at 1001; Bono v. Saxbe, 527 F. Supp. 1182, 1195 (S.D. Ill.
1981); Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. at 525; see also Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d at 430
(Winters, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Fourth Circuit used totality of
conditions test before Chapman and should continue to do so); Heitman v. Gabriel, 524 F.
Supp. at 625 (totality of conditions test "seems currently to be accepted"); cf. Villaneuva v.
George, 659 F.2d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 1981) (using a totality of conditions test to measure
conditions suffered by a pretrial detainee in a jail).
71. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). The court in Hoplowlt
adhered to the prior Ninth Circuit decision in Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.
1981), decided before Chapman. The Seventh Circuit, in Smith v. Fairman, 690 F.2d 122,
125 (7th Cir. 1982), attempted to reconcile the Ninth Circuit approach with that of the other
federal courts, remarking that while Chapman does "essentially" mandate a totality of the
conditions of confinement approach, vague conclusions that the totality of conditions
amount to a constitutional violation are insufficient to make out a claim. The Ninth Circuit
seems to intend something more than this bland statement, however. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 100-06.
72. Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. at 1118.
73. The prison in Chapman was clearly overcrowded by any reasonable standard. See
supra note 6; infra note 95.
74. How broad the court's order could be is a more difficult question. See infra text
accompanying notes 97-106.
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punishment, the court could not remedy either the inadequate food service
or the overcrowding. Such an atomistic approach is not adequate to prevent
or redress inhumane conditions, particularly in light of Chapman's declara-
tion that neither double ceiling nor overcrowding is cruel and unusual per
se. Although Chapman does not preclude finding overcrowding or even
double ceiling cruel and unusual in an extreme case, even if other conditions
are adequate, 75 lower courts are likely to regard Chapman as disfavoring
such a holding. The totality test allows a court trying to follow Chapman a
palatable and clearly permissible context in which to address overcrowding.
The seemingly objective focus of the totality test is a welcome departure
from the more subjective focus in the only other case where the Court
discussed the eighth amendment standard to be applied in prison-Estelle v.
Gamble.7 6 In that case, the Court determined whether denial of medical care
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment by asking whether prison offi-
cials had shown "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's serious medical
needs. 77 The objective approach of Chapman seems to connote the Court's
recognition of the fact that prison conditions may be cruel and unusual
regardless of the mens rea of the warden, the state, or anyone else.78
The remaining question-really the more critical issue for defining the
scope of the eighth amendment-is the question of minimum standards. The
very idea of cruel and unusual punishment suggests that there is some
minimum standard embodied in the eighth amendment-that there is a
constitutional threshold below which no form of punishment, including
prison conditions, may be permitted to fall. The principal task for a court
judging whether conditions are cruel and unusual is to define this minimum
standard.79
75. At some point overcrowding itself might be cruel and unusual punishment, even if
food and other services remained adequate-if instead of two, the cells at the SOCF held
four, for example. See Union County Jail Inmates, 537 F. Supp. at 1004-05. Similarly,
double ceiling might amount to cruel and unusual punishment, even in the context of
otherwise adequate conditions, if the space per individual were significantly less than was
available at the SOCF and inmates spent more time in their cells. See, e.g., French, 538 F.
Supp. at 924-27 (ordering double ceiling to cease, after distinguishing Chapman).
Even if an inmate's needs for food, clothing and other services were being met, the
lowest standard for measuring inmates' minimum rights includes a right to adequate housing.
See infra notes 82-83. While the level of double ceiling in Chapman was found not to be cruel
and unusual, at some point extreme overcrowding could, by itself, violate the Constitution
by failing to meet the requirement of adequately housing prisoners.
76. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
77. Id. at 104.
78. See Note, Complex Enforcement, supra note 5, at 638-41 (suggesting that the
concepts of blame are more appropriate to discrete adjudication than to conditions cases);
Comment, Rhodes v. Chapman: Prison Conditions as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 22 S.
TEx. L. J. 374, 377-78 (1982) (remarking favorably on the objective focus of Chapman).
79. See Robbins & Buser, supra note 5; Note, Creatures, Persons and Prisoners: Evalu-
ating Prison Conditions Under the Eighth Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1099 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Creatures, Persons and Prisoners].
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Chapman does not explicitly address this issue but, again by inference,
it suggests that the Supreme Court is likely to be satisfied with quite a low
standard. The majority speaks of an inmate's right not to be deprived of the
"minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." 80 It describes Arkansas
prison conditions found to be cruel and unusual in an earlier case as having
caused "unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs." 81 In
the post-Chapman cases, several lower federal courts have declared that a
prison's constitutional obligation is only to provide inmates with "basic
human needs, ' 82 and that " 'an institution's obligation under the eighth
amendment is at an end if it furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate
food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.' "83
This standard approximates the standard the ASPCA and state law fre-
quently use to define cruelty to animals. 84
Given contemporary attitudes toward prisoners, most lower courts will
probably continue to find the basic human needs standard a sufficient
measure of the prison's or state's eighth amendment obligation. The Chap-
man opinion gives little indication that the Supreme Court will actively
require a standard recognizing the human dignity of prisoners as worthy of
constitutional protection. 5 The opinion belittles the loss of privacy inmates
suffer due to double ceiling, scoffs at the idea of a constitutionally based
right to rehabilitation,8" and cheerfully accepts the notion that prisoners
may be subjected to harsh and restrictive, uncomfortable, or even painful
80. 452 U.S. at 347.
81. Id.
82. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1259.
83. Id. at 1246 (quoting Wright, 642 F.2d at 1132-33 (quoting Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d
118, 125 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979))).
84. The analogy between conditions to which pets are entitled and conditions to which
prisoners should be entitled under the eighth amendment is drawn not infrequently, some-
times ironically and sometimes in earnest. See French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. at 913 (treating
as possibly dispositive of plaintiff prisoners' claim that their housing conditions violated the
eighth amendment a section of the Indianapolis code setting forth requirements for animal
owners regarding adequate shelter, ventilation, temperature control, and space for exercise);
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1981) (report from the county health director
stating that the SPCA would not permit animals to be housed under current county jail
conditions); see generally Note, Creatures, Persons and Prisoners. See supra note 79 for
elaboration on this analogy.
85. At least one member of the Court has expressed the view that dignity is not an
appropriate concern in an eighth amendment prison conditions case, even though earlier
Supreme Court case law had declared the touchstone of the eighth amendment to be
"nothing less than the dignity of man," Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100. See Atiych v.
Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315-16 (1981) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice). There is also support for
the opposite view, although probably by a minority of justices. See Chapman, 452 U.S. at
361 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The task of the courts in cases challenging prison conditions
is to determine whether a challenged punishment comports with human dignity.") (quoting
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
86. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 348.
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conditions87 without those conditions being deemed cruel and unusual. The
opinion reflects the Court's sympathy with a narrow interpretation of the
eighth amendment, one which perpetuates the view of prisoners as crea-
tures. Nevertheless, because the Chapman Court did not commit itself to a
low eighth amendment standard, the courts are free for now to apply a
standard that recognizes that prisoners are people and to hope that, despite
hints to the contrary, the Supreme Court will not disagree.
Another troubling aspect of Chapman's eighth amendment teleology is
the Court's suggestion that the content of a minimum standard might
properly be determined by public opinion, perhaps as embodied in legisla-
tion . 8 Public opinion is characterized as a more objective standard than the
subjective opinion of judges.8 9 The Court neglected a more obvious limita-
tion on the subjectivity of judicial opinion by taking a jaundiced attitude
toward judicial reliance on expert and professional standards. 0 To the
extent that legislation on prison capacity is likely to be based on expert
studies and opinion, following the Court's suggestion might lead to the same
results. However, the Court seems to be looking to legislation not for
evidence of contemporary professional standards of decency,"' but as evi-
dence of majority vill. The suggestion that untutored public opinion is the
best measure of the eighth amendment's protectionP2 is flatly inconsistent
with the antimajoritarian thrust of the Constitution. 3 Perhaps for this
reason, the lower federal courts thus far have shown little interest in refer-
ring to legislation for a standard. Another, more likely explanation is that
the district court judges who view prison conditions are left with little doubt
87. Id. at 347-49. A narrow view of the constitutional limitations on punishment,
apparently based on an assumption that punishment is largely retributive, is again most
clearly reflected in the theories of Justice Rehnquist. See Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. at 1316
(observing that prisoners were not promised a rose garden).
88. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 346-47.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 348 n.13.
91. See id. at 346-47, 349.
92. Id. The Court's opinions on the death penalty also suggest that legislation and
public opinion are relevant as measures of the eighth amendment. See Enmund v. Florida,
102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) (plurality opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-97 (1977); see
also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 279-81 (1980).
93. West Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The very purpose
of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts."); see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREiE COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 83-84 (1978); Bishin, Judicial Reviews, in Democratic Theor 50 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1099, 1109 (1977); Swygert, In Defense of Judicial Activism, 16 VAL. U.L.
REv. 439, 444-45 (1982).
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that, by any reasonable standard, the conditions they confront are cruel and
unusual. 94
Subsequent litigation may provide a more expansive view of the eighth
amendment than Chapman suggests. The context of Chapman made it
difficult for the Court to be either more precise or more generous about the
scope of the eighth amendment. Had the Court accepted plaintiffs' argu-
ment that each prisoner is entitled to a certain minimum amount of living
space, it would have had to select a figure. Selecting a particular figure
might have seemed subjective. Had the Court attempted to avoid the ap-
pearance of subjectivity by choosing a minimum space requirement en-
dorsed by the majority of experts in the field,95 the decision would have been
tantamount to declaring approximately two-thirds of the occupants of the
nation's prisons and jails to be suffering conditions violative of the eighth
amendment. 6 The opinion in Chapman was, for this reason alone, no
surprise.
C. The Scope of the Remedy
It is in the area of remedy, curiously enough, that the Chapman deci-
sion has had the most constricting impact on the lower courts. Chapman did
not reach the issue of remedy because it did not find any rights violated.
Nevertheless, after Chapman several courts of appeals modified district
court injunctions that had been issued before Chapman, rendering the
district court orders more general and more conservative. 7 Most of the
94. It is interesting to note that the district judges, perhaps for the same reason, have
been more generous in their application of the eighth amendment than have the courts of
appeals. See Smith v. Fairman, 690 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'g 528 F. Supp. 186 (C.D.
Ill. 1981) (district court found conditions at the Pontiac Correctional Center to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment; court of appeals reversed, questioning the weight the district
court placed on various findings of fact. The district judge had presided over twelve days of
trial, viewed 114 exhibits and, probably most significantly, had toured the prison). See also
Ruiz, 679 F.2d 1115. Justice Burger's remark that one visit to a prison is enough to make a
prison reform zealot out of anyone seems to be as true as ever.
95. Expert estimates of the minimum amount of space needed for each prisoner range
from 50 square feet per prisoner (National Council on Crime and Delinquency) to 55 (Army)
to 60 (American Public Health Association, U.S. Department of Justice), to 75 (American
Correctional Association) to 80 (National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Stan-
dards and Goals). See Chapman, 452 U.S. at 356 & n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring); 434 F.
Supp. at 1021; 3 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS 49-51 (1980).
At SOCF, two inmates shared a 63 square foot cell.
96. Approximately two-thirds of all inmates of American jails and prisons at the time of
the National Institute of Justice study were confined in cells or dormitories providing less
than 60 square feet of space per inmate, I NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, AMIRICAN
PRISONS AND JAILS 61-63 (1980). Justice Brennan noted the significance of this fact in his
concurring opinion, Chapman, 452 U.S. at 356.
97. Ruiz, 688 F.2d at 266; Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1237; Nelson, 659 F.2d at 420.
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courts of appeals did not reverse the district courts' findings that eighth
amendment violations existed,9 8 demonstrating either a reasonably generous
view of Chapman's eighth amendment standard, or a healthy respect for the
district courts' findings of fact. However, in the area of remedy, the Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Circuits all seemed to interpret Chapman as requiring the
federal courts to be extremely cautious about ordering any remedy more
specific than one requiring defendant prison officials to submit a plan to
correct conditions found unconstitutional. 9
The Ninth Circuit's view of the remedial powers of federal courts is the
most restrictive,100 and is connected to that court's decision to reject the
totality of conditions test.10' The Ninth Circuit seems to believe that the
totality of conditions test places federal courts in the untenable position of
being unable to order relief for a constitutional violation. If, the argument
runs, a court reviews a number of prison conditions, no one of which by
itself violates the eighth amendment, but finds that an eighth amendment
violation exists because of the totality of conditions, what then can the court
do? It cannot order food service to be improved when the food service itself
is not unconstitutionally inadequate; it cannot order additional guards to be
hired if violence is no worse than at other facilities. 0 2 Not wishing to be
confronted 'with this dilemma, the Ninth Circuit simply rejected the totality
of conditions test. Taken to its extreme, this view would make it impossible
for a court ever to order a prison to decrease overcrowding, since over-
crowding, according to Chapman, is unlikely to violate the Constitution in
and of itself, and would make federal court relief from sordid and deplor-
able conditions generally unlikely.
The Ninth Circuit's view is a reductio ad absurdum of a principle that
other jurisdictions have found attractive: that a federal court should not
98. But see Smith v. Fairman, 690 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'g 528 F. Supp. 186
(C.D. II1. 1981); Ruiz, 688 F.2d at 266 & 679 F.2d at 1115, rev'g in part 503 F. Supp. 1265
(reversed some parts of the district court's findings of eighth amendment violations).
99. The remaining circuits have not yet had the opportunity to express their views on the
impact of Chapman. In Villaneuva v. George, 659 F.2d at 851, a case on conditions in
pretrial detention, the Eighth Circuit gave some indication that the reasonably generous
views that circuit has been known for since its opinion in Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571
(8th Cir. 1968) are likely to prevail after Chapman as well.
A deferential approach to remedy is recommended after extensive discussion of the
process of implementing decrees in institutional reform litigation in Special Project, The
Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COL. L. REv. 784 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Special Project].
100. See Hoptowit, 632 F.2d at 1247.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
102. In Hoptowit, the Ninth Circuit perceived that under a totality of conditions test a
broad remedy, correcting even conditions not unconstitutional if viewed in isolation, would
be appropriate, 682 F.2d at 1247. See Robbins & Buser, supra note 5, at 922-26 (totality of
conditions test requires a broad remedy, possibly affecting conditions not unconstitutional
by themselves).
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issue greater or more specific injunctive relief than is absolutely necessary to
remedy the constitutional violation. 10 3 The totality of the conditions test
itself does, as the Ninth Circuit perceived, create remedy problems. If
neither the provision of food service nor the level of institutional violence is
unconstitutional taken alone, but becomes unconstitutional in conjunction
with heavy overcrowding, then the courts may be inclined to avoid issuing a
specific order at all and to allow prison administrators to choose between
reducing the inmate population and enhancing the provision of services.
There are several problems with this approach. Defendants in prison
conditions litigation have not established a very impressive track record of
correcting conditions found unconstitutional, of submitting workable plans,
or of cooperating enthusiastically with the implementation of court or-
ders. 0 4 It would be unfair to ascribe the indifferent, dilatory or even ob-
structionist attitudes of some defendants to all. However, as Ninth Circuit
Judge Tang noted, his circuit's view of the totality of conditions test seems
to disable a court from taking the next step and issuing a more specific order
if the option of ordering defendants to submit a plan is tried but fails. 10
Without a meaningful remedy, intervention and the ensuing declaration
of eighth amendment violations are hollow. Of course, finding an eighth
amendment violation should not be taken as a license to put a prison system
into receivership and to usurp all the decision-making authority of prison
administrators. But the breadth of remedies under the eighth amendment
must be commensurate with the breadth of the right. Even if a court wishes
to begin the remedial stage by asking defendants to choose among alterna-
tive means of redress, the court must be willing to elect and implement
remedies to redress constitutional violations if the defendants fail to take
adequate remedial measures. 106
103. "[A] court can order only relief sufficient to correct the violation found," and
relief must be "consistent with the policy of minimum intrusion into the affairs of state
prison administration." Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1145. Therefore, a "wait and see" approach,
ordering only moderate relief at first, with the possibility of more stringent and specific relief
to follow if conditions are not corrected, is to be preferred. Id. at 1145-53. See Special
Project, supra note 99, at 790-813.
Justice Rehnquist has suggested the existence of a Charybdis to oppose the Scylla of
overly specific orders: the provision in FED. R. Civ. P. R. 65(d) that injunctive orders must
be "specific in terms." Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. at 1317.
104. See Special Project, supra note 99, at 837-42 for a discussion of judicial responses
to non-compliance and numerous cases in which such responses were necessary in a variety of
institutional litigation. Even the Supreme Court has been confronted with this problem. See
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (affirming an award of attorneys' fees based on the
District Court's finding that defendant prison officials acted in bad faith, stalling and failing
to comply with court orders in the Arkansas litigation).
105. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1266 (Tang, J., concurring).
106. See Robbins & Buser, supra note 5, at 926-30; Robbins, Federalism, State Prison
Reform, and Evolving Standards of Human Decency: On Guessing, Stressing and Redressing
Constitutional Rights, 26 U. KAN. L. REv. 551, 557-63 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Robbins].
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With the scope of intervention, the scope of the constitutional right and
the scope of the remedy all undetermined, the future of institutional litiga-
tion in the federal courts is difficult to foretell. In light of the Burger
Court's notions of federalism and its general attitude toward prisoners, it
seems unlikely that the Court will lead the way to a vigorously intervention-
ist position. But Chapman, given its ambiguity, need not prevent the lower
federal courts from defining and implementing their own concepts of appro-
priate federal court intervention.
II
INSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION IN THE STATE COURTS
Remarkably little litigation over prison conditions has taken place in
the state courts. Since Rhodes v. Chapman was decided, there have been no
more than ten reported state court decisions even citing Chapman. The
hegemony of federal court litigation in this area is surprising given that a
tremendous opportunity exists for plaintiffs to create a forum more hospita-
ble to institutional litigation in the state courts. 07 The opportunity is born
of need, but it is an opportunity nonetheless.
A. The Scope of Review
Although state courts may still wish to exercise a degree of judicial
restraint, federalism and comity concerns can be bled out when institutional
litigation takes place in state court. The federal courts' sometimes restrictive
justiciability doctrines, for example, reflect a reluctance to interfere with
state institutions.108 Contrast that noninterventionist attitude with the ap-
proach of the judges in Kent County, Michigan. They found the conditions
in the Kent County Jail overcrowded, set a population limit, and backed it
up with a release order of the type the federal courts are reluctant to use."0a
They even set out a formula for determining the order in which inmates
should be released if the population cap were exceeded.110 The order was
reversed by the Michigan Court of Appeals for the simple and unfortunate
107. Professor Neuborne has argued that institutional differences between state and
federal court in fact justify the public law litigator's traditional preference for federal court.
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HA.v. L. REv. 1105, 1118-30 (1977).
108. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) for an extreme use of justiciability
and federalism principles to defeat review of local police practices. Robbins & Buser, supra
note 5, at 897-900, argue that the theories of Rizzo should not apply to institutional litigation
concerning prison conditions. See also Robbins, supra note 106, at 563-67.
109. Kent County Prosecuting Att'y v. Kent County Cir. Judges, 110 Mich. App. 404,
405-06, 313 N.W.2d 135, 135-36 (1981). For an example of a federal court refusing to impose
a mandatory population limit despite overcrowding, see Vazquez, 523 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
110. Kent County Prosecuting Attorney, 110 Mich. App. at 407-09, 313 N.W.2d at 136-
37.
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reason that no case had been before the judges when they issued their
order."' Their decision was sua sponte, without even an inmate complaint
for a base. Why had no case been brought before such eager judges?
B. The Scope of the Right
Litigators concerned with the evidently meager content the Supreme
Court seems willing to ascribe to the eighth amendment should be increas-
ingly aware that the state courts are not necessarily limited either by the
language of the eighth amendment or by the Court's restrictive interpreta-
tions of it. The recently rediscovered state constitutions 12 provide several
avenues of escape from restrictive federal cases. First, some state constitu-
tions contain helpful provisions not included in the federal Constitution.
Justice Powell has told us that the Constitution does not mandate comfort-
able prisons.' 1 3 The Wyoming1 4 and Tennessee" 5 Constitutions do. The
Oregon Supreme Court, on the basis of some specific language in the
Oregon Constitution, has suggested that Oregon prisoners have a state
constitutional right to dignity,116 the very right the Supreme Court seems
inclined to read out of the eighth amendment.
Even where the state constitution contains language identical to that of
the eighth amendment, the state courts are not bound to adopt the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the parallel federal language." 7 In states whose
constitutions contain a guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment," 8
the courts are as free to reject all or part of the Supreme Court's eighth
amendment jurisprudence as the New York Court of Appeals was to reject
the Supreme Court's declaration that the due process clause does not guar-
antee contact visits for pretrial detainees," 9 or the California Supreme
Court was to reject the Burger Court's entire procedural due process doc-
trine.'20
111. Id.
112. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HAPv. L. REv. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States
Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. Rnv. 379 (1980); Developments in the Law, The Interpretation
of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324 and sources cited at 1328-29, 1334
n.20 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
113. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 349.
114. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 16.
115. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 32.
116. Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
117. See Developments, supra note 112, at 1356-66 for a discussion of factors a state
court should consider when deciding when to diverge from the federal courts' interpretation
of identical constitutional language.
118. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5.
119. Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188 (1979), cert. denied sub nora.
Lombard v. Cooper, 446 U.S. 984 (1980).
120. People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 266-69, 599 P.2d 622, 626-28, 158 Cal. Rptr.
316, 319-21 (1979). The California Supreme Court replaced the doctrine of Meachum v.
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C. The Scope of the Remedy
The state courts also have considerably more freedom to structure and
implement effective remedies, without the bonds of federalism and comity.
The tendency of the federal courts of appeals to reduce or dilute district
court injunctions was noted above.' 2' The Utah Supreme Court, by way of
contrast, recently expanded a trial court injunction in a prison conditions
case, adding more specific provisions concerning temperature, interior light-
ing and postage stamps to an order that already recommended the purchase
of toothbrushes. 2 2 Justice Powell has cautioned that expert opinions and
standards formulated by professional associations do not establish constitu-
tional minima. 23 They do in West Virginia, however, where the West
Virginia Supreme Court has adopted standards promulgated by the Ameri-
can Correctional Association and the Commission on Accreditation for
Correctional Standards to define the minimum content of the West Virginia
right to rehabilitation. This right was created by state legislation and is
enfbrceable through the state constitution's due process clause.124
III
CONCLUSION
It is not my contention that state court judges throughout the country
are sitting in their chambers eagerly awaiting prison conditions cases. The
federal courts were not anxious to become involved with prison litigation
and neither are the state courts. 2 5 Conditions in our prisons and jails are
revolting-it is with good reason that the public turns a blind eye to them. 20
Conditions litigation is lengthy and tedious. Frequently the courts must
retain jurisdiction for years and determine and redetermine the same issues,
often dealing with defendants who may be powerless to correct conditions
Fano, see supra notes 31-36, 42-44, and accompanying text, with a novel doctrine declaring a
substantive right to procedural fairness which the court derived from a law review article. See
Van Alstyne, Cracks in the New Property: Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative
State, 62 CoiR. L. Rv. 445, 487-90 (1977).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
122. Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d at 902.
123. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 348 n.13 (quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 543-44 & 543 n.27).
124. See Cooper v. Gwinn, 298 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1981).
125. Witness the plaintive remark of a district judge in Indiana in a case challenging
conditions at the Indiana State Prison: "This Judge has indicated from the beginning of this
case to the present time, a complete and utter distaste for having to cross that Rubicon which
separates the federal government from the state government and enter into the morass of the
day to day operation of the prison." Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. at 442.
126. See Chapman, 452 U.S. at 357-60 (Brennan, J., concurring). Michel Foucault has
raised the fascinating and deeply troubling suggestion that our prisons may not in fact be
failing to provide what the public really desires of punishment of the convicted. See M.
FOUCAuLT, Discipn AND Puosa 271-72 (1977).
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or recalcitrant to the point of contempt. 127 Judges are writing voluminous
opinions in prison conditions cases.1 28 Those who dismiss prisoner com-
plaints or who find against the prisoner plaintiffs rarely see their decisions
reversed, while judges who find constitutional violations face either the
possibility of reversal or modification on appeal, or the certainty of having
to implement their decrees. Despite all of these disincentives, the federal
courts have learned to tolerate prison conditions litigation, if not to love
it.129 That they do so is in part a tribute to the dedication of our district
judges and in part a tragic commentary on how deplorable the conditions in
our prisons and jails truly are. We should expect and demand the same high
personal standards from our state court judges, and higher, much higher,
institutional standards from our corrections system.
As any major case dealing with a significant and controversial issue,
Rhodes v. Chapman seemed to leave open more questions than it decided:
Where will institutional litigation take place in the next decade? What is the
standard against which our prisons will be measured? What remedies will
the courts adopt, and how will those remedies be implemented? What must
prisoners prove to establish an eighth amendment violation, and how, in the
face of the Supreme Court's chary attitude toward expert testimony, can
that burden of proof be met? To what extent will conditions in jails be
judged differently from the conditions in institutions housing sentenced
inmates? 30 The federal courts have already begun to forge answers to these
127. The District Court in Chapman v. Rhodes ordered the defendants to submit plans
five times and found the submitted plans inadequate each time before finally deciding to
issue particular relief. See 452 U.S. at 344. Ruiz v. Estelle has been in litigation for over four
years. The main trial in that case consumed 159 days. 679 F.2d at 1127. See Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978) for a partial account of the tortuous history of the Arkansas litigation.
Enforcement proceedings, which may lead to judicial involvement in a case for years
after final judgment, also entail a new and expanded concept of a judge's proper role in
litigation. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. R~v.
1281 (1976); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); Note, Implementa-
tion Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HAiv. L. REv. 428 (1977). The rather
outmoded notion that it is unseemly for a court to play a major role in a case after final
judgment may inform some courts' reluctance to issue specific decrees. In fact, institutional
litigation has occasioned an increased use of special masters to supervise implementation of
decrees. See Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10 TOL. L. Rnv.
419 (1979). This has occurred even in litigation over conditions in institutions other than
prisons. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children & Parisi v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d
Cir. 1983).
128. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Stipp. at 1052-1132; Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525
F. Supp. at 435-527.
129. After expressing distaste for the process, see supra note 125, Judge Sharp went on
to write an opinion of over ninety pages finding many of the conditions at the Indiana State
Prison not only distasteful but unconstitutional, and to issue various forms of relief. Hendrix
v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. at 435-527.
130. Several courts have opined that the "punishment" test of Wolfish, 441 U.S. at
520, should be read as guaranteeing pretrial detainees a standard of living superior to that
guaranteed sentenced prisoners under Chapman. See, e.g., Union County Jail Inmates, 537
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. XI1:299
INSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
questions; the state courts should be given the opportunity to find their own
answers. Institutional litigation can and should expand into state courts
even though Chapman has in no way closed the federal forum. Wherever
the court, judicial review of prison conditions is necessary. The courts
cannot alone cure the epidemic of prison overcrowding, but their vigilance is
necessary lest the default of the other branches becomes complete.13 '
F. Supp. at 1002-09; McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. at 759-62. See also Atiyeh v. Capps,
449 U.S. at 1316.
131. It has been argued that the principal function of the courts in prison conditions
cases is to act as a prod to the other branches of government. See Special Project, supra note
99; Prison Reform, supra note 52. This does not imply, of course, that the courts have not
been effective in improving conditions in particular prisons or prison systems by decree. See
M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, JR., AFTER DEcisioN: InPLE EtNTATION OF JuDICIAl. DECREES IN
CORRECONAL SETTINGS 3-29 (1977).
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